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Abstract
In their seminal work on systemic risk in financial markets, Eisenberg and Noe [12] proposed
and studied a model with n firms embedded into a network of debt relations. We analyze this
model from a game-theoretic point of view. Every firm is a rational agent in a directed graph
that has an incentive to allocate payments in order to clear as much of its debt as possible. Each
edge is weighted and describes a liability between the firms. We consider several variants of the
game that differ in the permissible payment strategies. We study the existence and computational
complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria, and we provide bounds on the (strong) prices of
anarchy and stability for a natural notion of social welfare. Our results highlight the power of
financial regulation – if payments of insolvent firms can be centrally assigned, a socially optimal
strong equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In contrast, worst-case strong equilibria can
be a factor of Ω(n) away from optimal, and, in general, computing a best response is an NP-hard
problem. For less permissible sets of strategies, we show that pure equilibria might not exist, and
deciding their existence as well as computing them if they exist constitute NP-hard problems.
1 Introduction
The last major financial crisis and its aftermath have highlighted the systemic risks and resulting
hazards for society that arise in financial markets, which are characterized by different, highly inter-
connected financial institutions. Over the last decade an increased research effort has been underway
to analyze, understand, and manage the systemic risks in financial markets. Main aspects of interest
are contagion effects and cascading defaults, as well as recommendations for suitable regulation on a
national and international level.
A prominent approach in the area of systemic risk stems from the seminal work by Eisenberg
and Noe [12]. Here the set V of financial institutions (or firms) is the node set of a directed graph
G = (V,E). The directed and weighted edges e ∈ E express the debt relations among firms. In
addition, each firm has non-negative external assets, which capture the value of property rights (such
as real-estate, gold, business and mortgage loans, etc.) that the firm has acquired from non-financial
institutions. Eisenberg and Noe discuss a clearing mechanism for such a market, in which every
firm v uses its available assets to pay its debt. The clearing follows basic balance sheet identities
and evolves rather mechanically. It is commonly assumed that payments are distributed among all
creditors in a pro-rata fashion, i.e. for each interbank debt (i.e., each outgoing edge) firm v allocates
a proportional share of its available assets. Similarly, a firm receives the payments for its incoming
edges (so-called internal assets), which in turn are also paid proportionally to outgoing edges (until
all debt is paid or all assets are distributed). In this way, clearing payments constitute a fixed point of
the system. Eisenberg and Noe discuss existence and uniqueness issues of such fixed point payments.
While the model has been studied intensively over the last two decades, there are a plethora of
open questions, especially towards understanding strategic and game-theoretic issues. In this paper,
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our focus are the strategic incentives and their consequences for clearing mechanisms in financial
markets. For example, rather than using pro-rata payments, financial institutions often put priority
on clearing certain debts first. In this way, a firm v could profit substantially when using a suitable
priority-based payment scheme – by clearing certain debt first, the money propagates through the
network and returns to v in the form of additional internal assets. In the Eisenberg-Noe model, it
is easy to see that the intuitive pro-rata clearing mechanism is not always incentive compatible, and
strategic incentives of this kind can arise frequently.
In this paper, we study the properties of priority-based clearing mechanisms for financial markets.
We focus on payment schemes that constitute a pure Nash or even a strong equilibrium in the
underlying strategic payment game for the firms. In this way, firms have no unilateral or coalitional
incentives to deviate from the payment schemes proposed by the clearing mechanism. Depending on
the granularity of priorities, the resulting games have different properties. In particular, if priorities
are implemented over debt contracts, existence of a pure Nash or a strong equilibrium becomes
strongly NP-hard to decide. Instead, if priorities are implemented over units of money, a strong
equilibrium always exists and can be computed in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, in this case,
there is even a strong equilibrium that maximizes the sum of all assets of all firms.
Our results imply interesting insights for bankruptcy settlement of insolvent firms. It turns out
that only insolvent firms face a potential strategic decision about where to allocate money in order to
maximize the internal assets through network effects (or, equivalently, minimize the remaining debt
after clearing the network). In case there is a benevolent and centralized bankruptcy settlement, we
show that it can implement a clearing mechanism with monotone payment strategies that leads to a
socially optimal clearing state. It comes with the additional guarantee of giving no coalition of firms
an incentive to pay their debts differently.
Instead, if clearing payments are determined by suitable negotiation in a decentralized fashion
resulting in some arbitrary Nash or strong equilibrium, the total amount of internal assets available
to the firms in the system can deteriorate drastically. Similar problems arise if a centralized clear-
ing mechanism is restricted to payment schemes based on priorities over single loans (rather than
units of money). This can lead to non-existence of pure equilibria in the resulting games. Even if
equilibria exist, they can be undesirable since the total amount of internal assets of all firms can be
drastically smaller than in an optimal solution. This shows a marked contrast between centralized
and decentralized bankruptcy settlement and highlights how the structure of permissible payment
strategies impacts the performance and the structural properties of the clearing mechanism.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we study the properties of priority-based clearing mechanisms for financial markets.
We assume the network of liabilities is given, but insolvency resolution is driven by strategic consid-
erations. In particular, we analyze payment schemes that constitute a pure Nash or even a strong
equilibrium in the underlying strategic payment game for the firms.
Below we introduce basic preliminaries of the Eisenberg-Noe model. In addition, we introduce
two classes of priority-based payment strategies for the firms and analyze the resulting clearing
mechanisms. For an edge-ranking strategy, a firm ranks its debt contracts and assigns its assets in
order of the ranking. As a superset of strategies, we consider coin-ranking strategies, where money
is considered in units (“coins”). Instead of contracts, each firm ranks single coin payments to the
contracts. By letting the value of a coin approach zero, coin-ranking strategies become equivalent
to monotone strategies, where the payments of a firm are simply a monotone function of its total
available assets.
In Section 2 we present structural insights on the clearing states for a strategy profile in an edge-
or coin-ranking game. In such a profile, each firm is choosing an edge- or coin-ranking strategy to pay
its debt. For each such profile, we prove that the possible clearing states form a lattice with respect
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to the vector of assets of each firm (Theorem 3). In particular, there is a unique clearing state that
pointwise maximizes the assets available to each firm (given this strategy profile). In Appendix B
we show that it can be computed in strongly polynomial time (Proposition 18). We assume that this
state defines the assets and, thus, the utility of each firm in the strategy profile. Similar properties
were shown in [12] for profiles composed of pro-rata payment strategies.
In Section 3 we study coin-ranking games and strategic choice of payments. Our interest lies
in the existence, computational complexity, and social quality of equilibria. We show that there
always is a strategy profile that represents a strong equilibrium, in which no coalition of firms has
an incentive to deviate. Furthermore, it maximizes social welfare, i.e., the sum of all assets or total
revenue available to all firms. Such a strong equilibrium can be computed in strongly polynomial
time (Theorem 6). It can represented compactly, even though the strategy shall rank all (possibly
pseudo-polynomially many) coins that a firm might have available. In contrast, it is strongly NP-hard
to find a best-response strategy for a single firm in a given arbitrary strategy profile of a coin-ranking
game (Theorem 9).
For worst-case equilibria and the strong price of anarchy, we show that the deterioration of social
welfare in a strong equilibrium compared to a social optimum is tightly characterized by the min-
max length of cycles in any social optimum (Theorem 11). This implies that networks with optimal
money circulation composed of small cycles yield a small inefficiency in strong equilibria. In contrast,
a worst-case Nash equilibrium, which is stable only against unilateral deviations, can be arbitrarily
worse than a social optimum, even in simple games with a constant number of firms (Proposition 10).
In Section 4 we study equilibria in edge-ranking games, where all firms are restricted to play edge-
ranking strategies. Restricting the strategy space to rankings over contracts can have devastating
consequences for the existence and social quality of equilibria. In edge-ranking games, pure Nash and
strong equilibria can be absent, and deciding their existence is strongly NP-hard (Theorem 14). The
same hardness applies for computing a social optimum, and for computing a pure Nash or strong
equilibrium when it is guaranteed to exist. Even the best strong equilibrium can be a factor of Ω(n)
worse than the social optimum in terms of social welfare (Proposition 16). For pure Nash equilibria,
even the best one can be arbitrarily worse than a social optimum (Proposition 17).
1.2 Related Work
Financial Networks. On a conceptual level, we study issues of strategic choice and computational
complexity in financial networks. There have been works addressing computational complexity of
diverse issues, such as pricing options with [3] and without information asymmetry [6], finding clearing
payments with credit default swaps [27], or estimating the number of defaults when providing a shock
in the financial system [19]. In addition, many extensions to the model by Eisenberg and Noe have
been proposed in the literature on financial markets. However, even models including cross-holdings
of equity [29], default costs [26], or debt contracts of different maturities [14] follow the idea of
the basic approach that all contracts have to be cleared consistently, i.e., clearing payments locally
adhere to the rather mechanical clearing rule and constitute a fixed point solution globally. Indeed,
Barucca et al. [5] have recently shown that many of the above models can be unified in terms of
self-consistent network valuations. A well-known result of such models is the “robust-yet-fragile”
property exhibited by financial networks, i.e., contagion arises in an all-or-nothing fashion akin to
the formation of a giant connected component in random graph models [16]. This provides important
insights into systemic risk and advises the need for macro-prudential regulation.
Accordingly, the rather mechanical pro-rata payments are also usually presumed in models study-
ing contagion effects arising from overlapping portfolios [7,8]. In this case, distressed firms are selling
assets which in turn decreases the value of these assets by market impact. Here, it is commonly
assumed that firms mechanically sell all their assets in a pro-rata fashion. In turn, the resulting
market impact is modeled as a known function parametrized by the market depth or liquidity of each
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asset. In contrast, especially decisions regarding the portfolio composition of financial firms yield
substantial potential for strategic consideration in reality.
To our knowledge, strategic aspects are currently reflected mostly in models of network forma-
tion [1, 13]. A three period economy is assumed where firms can invest into risky assets. To do so,
they strategically decide to borrow funds from outside investors as well as other firms. Thereby a
network of financial cross-holdings is endogenously formed as each firm maximizes their expected
profit. The results show that risk-seeking firms tend to over-connect leading to stronger contagion
and systemic risk as compared to the socially optimal risk-sharing allocation. Note that in this case,
strategic aspects only play a role in the formation of inter-bank relations whereas the clearing mech-
anism is assumed to follow the same process as in [12]. Another strategic variant of the model by
Eisenberg and Noe has been considered in [2] in the form of a two-period model. Firms strategically
store some amount from their first period endowment with an interest rate in order to increase the
available assets in the second period. The clearing in both rounds is based on pro-rata payments.
Each firm optimizes a function of the remaining debts in both periods.
Flow Games. On a more technical level, our game-theoretic approach is related to a number of
existing game-theoretic models based on flows in networks. In cooperative game theory, there are
several notions of flow games based on a directed flow network. Existing variants include games,
where edges are players [4, 10, 11, 17, 20, 21], or each player owns a source-sink pair [24, 25]. The
total value of a coalition C is the profit from a maximum (multi-commodity) flow that can be routed
through the network if only the players in C are present. There is a rich set of results on structural
characterizations and computability of solutions in the core, as well as other solution concepts for
cooperative games. In contrast to our work, these games are non-strategic. Instead, here we consider
each player as a single node with a strategic decision about flow allocation.
More recently, a class of strategic flow games has been proposed in [18,23]. There is a capacitated
flow network with a set of sources nodes. At each source node, a given amount of flow enters the
network. Each node of the network is owned by a single player. Each player always owns a designated
sink node, as well as one or more additional nodes from the network. A player can choose a flow
strategy for each of her nodes. The flow strategy specifies, for every node v and every x ≥ 0, how an
incoming flow of x at v is distributed onto the outgoing edges (if any). Each flow strategy needs to
fulfill flow conservation constraints at every node, subject to capacity on the outgoing edges. Each
player aims to maximize the incoming flow at its sink node.
For these games there exist a number of Σp2-completeness results for, e.g., determining the value of
a game in a two-player Stackelberg variant, or determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium
in a multi-player variant. In the latter game, computing a best response can also be NP-hard. Our
approach is related to these games. However, motivated by financial networks we assume each firm
is a single (source) node. The firm optimizes the incoming flow at its node (without it being a sink
node). We study the computational complexity and social quality of equilibria. Moreover, strategic
incentives arise mainly from cycles in the network – a condition absent in the existing work on
max-flow games [18,23] where the network is assumed to be acyclic.
The problem of calculating a clearing state for a given strategy profile in our games is closely
related to the notion of a stable flow studied in [15]. In the stable flow problem, each node is equipped
with an externally given preference order over both incoming and outgoing arcs. There always exists
a stable flow, and the set of stable flows forms a lattice. The model has been extended to an over
time setting in [9].
1.3 Financial Networks with Payment Strategies
Network Model. We consider a financial network model due to Eisenberg and Noe [12]. There is
a network G = (V,E) with node set V of institutions or firms. Each firm v ∈ V has external assets
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of value axv ≥ 0. Moreover, the firms are related via a set E of liabilities. Each liability (u, v) ∈ E is
a directed edge from firm u ∈ V to firm v ∈ V . The weight c(e) ≥ 0 of some edge e = (u, v) is the
amount of money that u owes to v. We denote by E+(v) = {(v, u) ∈ E} and by E−(v) = {(u, v) ∈ E}
the set of outgoing and incoming edges of v ∈ V , respectively. The total liabilities ℓ(v) of firm v is
the total amount of money firm v owes to other firms, i.e.,
ℓ(v) =
∑
e∈E+(v)
c(e).
We strive to understand issues of computational complexity. As such, we will assume that all numbers
in the input, i.e., all axv and c(e), are integer numbers.
We consider clearing mechanisms based on strategic payments decisions. A money flow fe on
edge e satisfies 0 ≤ fe ≤ c(e). Given a money flow on each edge, the internal assets of firm v are the
total incoming money from other firms, i.e.,
aiv =
∑
e∈E−(v)
fe.
The total assets of v are the sum of external and internal assets av = a
x
v + a
i
v. A firm is insolvent if
its total assets are strictly smaller than its total liabilities, i.e., av < ℓ(v).
Eisenberg and Noe define a clearing mechanism with money flows given by pro-rata payments.
In their clearing mechanism, each firm v distributes its total assets av proportionally on its outgoing
edges until all debt is paid. More formally, every edge e ∈ E+(v) is assigned a money flow of
fe(av) = min
{
c(e), av ·
c(e)
ℓ(v)
}
. Firm v keeps the surplus av − ℓ(v) ≥ 0 for itself, if any.
Payment Strategies. In this paper, we analyze incentives when firms strategically manipulate
their payments. As such, we study money flow games defined as follows. Each firm v ∈ V chooses
as a strategy a parametrized flow function fe(y) for every outgoing edge e ∈ E
+(v) and every y ≥ 0.
The strategy fv = (fe(y))e∈E+(v) must satisfy for every y ≥ 0
0 ≤ fe(y) ≤ c(e) (capacity constraint) (1)∑
e∈E+(v)
fe(y) = min{y, ℓ(v)} (no-fraud constraint) (2)
Intuitively, the strategy specifies, for every possible value y ≥ 0 of total assets available to firm v,
how v will allocate these assets to pay its debts. The capacity constraint ensures that no debt is
overpaid, the no-fraud constraint requires that v does not embezzle assets as long as there is unpaid
debt. This definition includes pro-rata payments as one possible strategy profile. Given a strategy
profile f = (fv)v∈V , a clearing state a = (av)v∈V is a vector of assets such that
av = a
x
v +
∑
e=(u,v)∈E−(v)
fe(au) (fixed point constraint) (3)
holds for all nodes v ∈ V . The utility of firm v is av, i.e., v’s goal is to choose a strategy to maximize
its total assets in the clearing state.
Proposition 1. If all fe(y) are continuous, there exists at least one clearing state.
The proof is a straightforward application of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and thus omitted. If
strategies are not continuous, it is easy to construct examples where no clearing state exists. Still,
even for a continuous strategy profile f , there could be multiple clearing states a (even for pro-rata
profiles). Given sufficiently complex strategy profiles with compact representation, computation of a
clearing state might even become computationally difficult.
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Edge-Ranking Games. In the rest of the paper, we focus on a set of rich and meaningful strategy
spaces, for which we can single out a unique clearing state with a simple algorithm. An intuitive
and well-motivated class of strategies can be derived via rankings or seniorities. In an edge-ranking
game, each player v ∈ V spends its assets to pay its debts according to a strict and total order
over E+(v), which we represent by a permutation πv = (e1, e2, . . .). v first pays all debt of edge
e1 = πv(1), then e2 = πv(2), etc. until all debt is paid or it runs out of assets. Formally, fei(y) =
min{c(ei),max{0, y −
∑
j<i c(ej)}}. The edge-ranking strategy of v is fully described by the ranking
πv, hence we denote a strategy profile in edge-ranking games by pi = (πv)v∈V .
Coin-Ranking Games. As a strict superset of such strategies, consider the case where each player
v ∈ V can spend its assets to pay its debts in a monotone fashion. In coin-ranking games, we rely on
integrality of all values for ce and a
x
v , and interpret money flow as being discretized into “coins” of
value 1. Thus, for a coin-ranking strategy, the parametrized flow functions fe(y) for every outgoing
edge e ∈ E+(v) are defined on the non-negative integer numbers fe(y) : N0 → N0. They are
characterized by capacity and no-fraud constraints, and, for every y, y′ ∈ N0 with y ≥ y
′
fe(y) ≥ fe(y
′) (monotonicity constraint) (4)
Note that, by letting the value of a coin tend to 0, coin-ranking strategies become arbitrary monotone
strategies fe(y) : R≥0 → R≥0.
Coin-ranking strategies generalize edge-ranking strategies. Maybe counterintuitively, every coin-
ranking game is also a special edge-ranking game – replacing each edge e with weight c(e) many
multi-edges of unit weight expands a coin-ranking game into an equivalent edge-ranking game. This
expansion implies a pseudo-polynomial blow-up in representation size. Nevertheless, the structural
equivalence is very useful for characterizing and analyzing solutions to coin-ranking games.
Intuitively, when playing a coin-ranking strategy in the expanded edge-ranking game, a player
v pays the first coin of assets to the multi-edge πv(1), the second coin to πv(2), etc. until all debt
is paid or v runs out of assets. Hence, the representation of a coin-ranking strategy might require
pseudopolynomial size (even in the original non-expanded game). We discuss this issue below in
Section 3.1. It turns out that in every coin-ranking game, we can restrict attention to a subset of
compactly representable coin-ranking strategies.
Clearing States and Utilities. For a given strategy profile pi in an edge- or coin-ranking game,
we determine the utility using a clearing state aˆ, where we choose the one that maximizes the total
revenue in the network, i.e., the sum of total assets available to all firms
Rev(pi,a) =
∑
v∈V
av =
∑
v∈V
axv +
∑
e=(u,v)∈E
fe(au) =
∑
v∈V
axv +
∑
e∈E+(v)
fe(av).
In many cases the clearing state is unique, and there is no choice based on maximum revenue.
Moreover, in case there are several clearing states in an edge-ranking game, it turns out that they
can be arranged into a lattice with coordinate-wise maximum inducing a partial order. We choose
the coordinate-wise maximal clearing state, since it maximizes Rev(pi,a) as a natural measure of
social welfare. In this sense, the properties of edge-ranking games mirror the conditions shown for
pro-rata payments in [12]. We prove these conditions in the subsequent section.
2 Clearing States
2.1 Circulation Structure in Money Flow Games
We observe a useful circulation representation of clearing states in money flow games. Given a strat-
egy profile f , the fixed point and no-fraud constraints imply for any clearing state a the conservation
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of money flow. Now using an auxiliary source s, we can represent all money flows in a in the form
of a circulation. We build an circulation network G′ by adding node s, for every v ∈ V we add
an auxiliary edge (v, s) with capacity c((v, s)) = ∞, and for every v ∈ V with axv > 0 we add an
auxiliary edge (s, v) with c((s, v)) = axv . In this way, external assets of v become internal assets via
a flow on edge (s, v). Surplus assets of w become a flow on edge (w, s), i.e., the internal assets of s.
Proposition 2. For every clearing state a of a strategy profile f in a money flow game, the flow
in G′ can be decomposed and represented as a circulation. The auxiliary source s has assets of
as =
∑
v∈V a
x
v , and all auxiliary edges (s, v) are saturated.
Proof. This is a simple consequence of fixed point and no-fraud constraints. Surplus at firm v ∈ E
exists only if v pays all debt ∑
e∈E+(v)
fe(av) = min(av , ℓ(v)) .
Moreover, the total external assets constitute the total net revenue:∑
v∈V
axv =
∑
v∈V
axv +
∑
v∈V
∑
e=(u,v)∈E−(v)
fe(au)−
∑
v∈V
∑
e=(u,v)∈E−(v)
fe(au)
=
∑
v∈V
av −
∑
e∈E+(v)
fe(av) =
∑
v∈V
max{0, av − ℓ(v)}
The net revenue of every firm gets routed to the auxiliary source s and constitutes the assets as.
Thus as =
∑
v∈V max{0, av − ℓ(v)} =
∑
v∈V a
x
v , and all auxiliary edges (s, v) are saturated. Overall,
by routing the surplus assets to s, we obtain exact flow conservation at every node. As such, the
flow can be decomposed and represented as a circulation.
2.2 Structure for Monotone Strategies
Lattice Structure. Consider an arbitrary money-flow game and a strategy profile f of monotone
strategies. Let A be the set of feasible clearing states for a strategy profile f . We show that (A,≥)
forms a lattice with the coordinate-wise comparison. Formally, a ≥ a′ iff av ≥ a
′
v for all v; and a > a
′
iff av ≥ a
′
v for all v and av > a
′
v for at least one v.
Theorem 3. For every strategy profile f in a money-flow game with monotone strategies, the pair
(A,≥) forms a lattice.
Proof. Consider A =
{
a
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ av ≤ axv +∑e∈E−(v) c(e), ∀v ∈ V }, a superset of all possible asset
vectors. Obviously, (A,≥) forms a lattice with the coordinate-wise comparison defined above. For a
given strategy profile f , the map g : A → A with g(a)v = a
x
v +
∑
e=(u,v)∈E−(v) fe(au) is a monotone
function for every firm v ∈ V , since for every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E the strategy of firm u implies that
fe is monotone in au. Obviously, the set of clearing states A is the set of fixed-point asset vectors of
g. The result follows by applying the Knaster-Tarski theorem.
Solvent Firms. The previous result implies uniqueness of aˆ for a given monotone strategy profile
f . We observe another interesting property, which shows that in monotone money flow games the
maximal clearing state aˆ is unique as long as all insolvent firms stick to their strategy. Since every
strategy satisfies capacity and no-fraud constraints, the payments of solvent firms remain the same if
they receive the same assets, and vice versa. Consequently, strategies of solvent firms have no impact
on the asset vector aˆ. For any solvent firm v, every strategy constitutes a best response.
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Proposition 4. For a given money flow game, consider any monotone strategy profile f , the corre-
sponding clearing state aˆ, and any solvent firm v with aˆv ≥ ℓ(v). Every strategy f
′v is a best response
for v against the other strategies f−v and results in the same clearing state aˆ.
Proof. Consider a deviation f ′v, the resulting state f ′ = (f ′v, f−v) and the resulting revenue-maximi-
zing clearing state a′. Suppose aˆ 6= a′. Firm v is solvent under aˆ, thus
∑
e∈E+(v) fe(aˆv) = l(v) and
fe(aˆv) = c(e). Using Theorem 3 we can assume w.l.o.g. that aˆ > a
′ (i.e., aˆu ≥ a
′
u for all firms u, and
aˆw > a
′
w for at least one firm w). We construct an equivalent game, in which we remove all edges
in E+(v) and instead increase external assets to a¯x(u) = axu + c(e) for all u with (v, u) ∈ E
+(v).
Observe that aˆ is still a feasible clearing state in the constructed game. However, any clearing state
a in the original game with av ≥ l(v) induces f(av) = c(e) independent of the chosen strategies of v
due to the non-fraud condition. Thus, any clearing state a with av ≥ l(v) in the new game is still a
feasible clearing state in the old game. We conclude that aˆ is a feasible clearing state under f ′. This
is a contradiction to the maximality of a′.
3 Coin-Ranking Games
3.1 Representation
An instance of a money flow game is given by the network G and integer numbers for edge weights
c(e) and external assets axu. Hence, the representation of the instance is logarithmic in input numbers
for c(e) and axu. In contrast, if we consider arbitrary coin-ranking strategies f
v for firm v, this specifies
a ranking over all coins of value 1. This is linear in
∑
e∈E+(v) c(e) and, thus, only pseudo-polynomial
in the instance representation. Our first observation is that in every coin-ranking game, we can
restrict attention to threshold-ranking strategies with a polynomial representation. A threshold-
ranking strategy πtv = (πv, τv) is composed of a permutation πv over E
+(v) and a vector of thresholds
τv = (τe)e∈E+(v) with 0 ≤ τe ≤ c(e) for every e ∈ E
+(v).
The interpretation is as follows. In πtv, firm v first pays τe to every edge e ∈ E
+(v), sequentially
in the order given by πv. Then, it pays the remaining c(e)−τe to every edge in the order given by πv.
That is, v first considers edge πv(1) and pays the first τπv(1) coins to this edge. The next τπv(2) coins
are paid to edge πv(2) etc. until
∑|E+(v)|
j=1 τπv(j) coins are paid to the edges (or v runs out of assets).
Then, the remaining c(πv(1)) − τπv(1) coins are paid to edge πv(1), then the next c(πv(2)) − τπv(2)
coins to πv(2) etc.
Indeed, we can restrict attention to threshold-ranking strategies in coin ranking games.
Proposition 5. For every strategy profile f in a coin-ranking game with clearing state aˆ and every
firm v, there is a threshold-ranking strategy πtv such that the profile (π
t
v ,pi−v) has the same clearing
state aˆ and, thus, the same utilities for all firms.
Proof. In this proof, we use the egde-ranking representation of coin-ranking games. Let pi denote the
strategy profile in the edge-ranking representation. If v is solvent in aˆ, the result follows from Propo-
sition 4 above. Consider an insolvent firm v. For the profile pi consider the TopCycleIncrease
algorithm that computes the clearing state aˆ. Since v is insolvent, there is some unpaid, top-ranked
unit-weight multi-edge (v,w) when the algorithm terminates. For the threshold-ranking strategy
πtv, we let πv(1) = (v,w). The other edges are assigned in arbitrary order. We assign thresholds
τe = fe(aˆv), i.e., equal to the money flow on edge e in the clearing state aˆ.
Observe that aˆ remains a clearing state in the profile (πtv ,pi−v). Thus, deviating from πv to π
t
v
does not decrease v’s assets. On the other hand, once the algorithm has assigned assets of aˆv to
v, it pays exactly τe to every edge e ∈ E
+(v). Then v starts paying for the remaining portions, so
πv = (v,w) is the top-ranked edge. As such, v has the same status as in the end of the algorithm on
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pi. Hence, v cannot be part of any further cycle of top-ranked edges, since otherwise this would have
been the case in pi as well. Therefore, aˆ is the maximum-revenue clearing state for (πtv,pi−v).
3.2 Existence and Computation of Equilibria
Our first result is that in every coin-ranking game there is a strong equilibrium that maximizes
the total revenue of all firms. This strong equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. In
particular, consider the instance (G, c, ax) as a money flow game and an arbitrary clearing state, i.e.,
a circulation of maximum value in the circulation network G′. This circulation is also a clearing state
of a strong equilibrium in threshold-ranking strategies.
Theorem 6. For every coin-ranking game, there is a strong equilibrium with money flows that
maximize the total revenue in the network. The strong equilibrium can be computed in polynomial
time.
Proof. Consider the circulation network G′ = (V,E′). An optimal circulation f∗ that maximizes the
total flow value saturates all outgoing auxiliary edges from s. Hence, it maximizes the total assets
of all firms ∑
e∈E′
f∗e = 2
∑
v∈V
axv +
∑
e∈E
f∗e =
∑
v∈V
axv +Rev(f
∗) .
f∗ can be computed in strongly polynomial time [30]. Since all edge weights are integral, we can
assume all f∗e are integral. We can turn this circulation into a clearing state for a strategy profile
with threshold-ranking strategies. Every firm v chooses an arbitrary order πv over E
+(v) and sets
thresholds τe = f
∗
e . Clearly, in this strategy profile the optimal circulation corresponds to the
maximum-revenue clearing state aˆ.
Let us prove that this strategy profile pi is a strong equilibrium. A coalition C ⊆ V of firms has
a profitable deviation pi′C = (π
′
v)v∈C if upon joint deviation of C to π
′
C , the resulting assets a
′ in the
new profile (pi′C ,pi−C) are strictly better, i.e. a
′
v > aˆv for every v ∈ C. We will show that no coalition
C ⊆ V has a profitable deviation.
Suppose for contradiction that there is a coalition C with a profitable deviation. Examine the new
profile (pi′C ,pi−C) and consider a firm v ∈ C. Since a
′
v > aˆv, there must be an edge (u, v) ∈ E
−(v)
that has strictly more incoming flow in the new profile f ′e(a
′
u) > fe(au). Now consider node u. If
u ∈ C, then a′u > au, so there is again some edge E
−(u) that has strictly more incoming flow in the
new profile. Otherwise, if u 6∈ C, then u still plays the threshold-ranking strategy obtained from f∗.
Since this is a monotone strategy, a higher flow on (u, v) can only occur if u has larger assets. Thus,
a′u > au, so there is again some edge E
−(u) that has more incoming flow in the new profile.
We can repeat this argument indefinitely. As such, there must be a cycle of edges that all have
more flow under (pi′C ,pi−C) than under pi. Such a cycle, however, can be used to increase the flow
circulation. This contradicts that aˆ represents an optimal circulation.
Remark 7. For the profitable deviation, we can even allow arbitrary continuous strategies and any
choice of clearing state for the deviation profile. As such, the strategy profile obtained from f∗ is a
strong equilibrium even in general money flow games (with suitable choice of clearing state).
Remark 8. If one allows deviations that weakly improve the coalition (i.e., a′u ≥ aˆu for all u ∈ C
and a′v > aˆv for at least one v ∈ C), it is a simple exercise to see that there are coin-ranking games,
in which no stable state (termed super-strong equilibrium) exists.
While it is computationally easy to compute a socially optimal strong equilibrium, computing a
best-response strategy for a general strategy profile can be strongly NP-hard, since best responses
can provide answers to computationally hard decision problems. For the following result, we assume
the coin-ranking game is given in the edge-ranking representation as a network with unit-weight
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multi-edges. Note that the edge weights in our instances of interest can be restricted to the set
{0, 1}. Thus, our construction needs no multi-edges, and the representation incurs no overhead. A
proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 9. For a given strategy profile f of a coin-ranking game, deciding whether a given firm
v has a best response resulting in assets at least k is strongly NP-complete. This holds even in
coin-ranking games without external assets and all edge weights in {0, 1}.
3.3 Total Revenue of Equilibria
In this section, we analyze the total revenue in pure Nash and strong equilibria. We relate this value
to the social optimum, i.e., the total sum of assets for all firms in the best strategy profile. Clearly,
since we proved existence of a system optimal strong equilibrium, the price of stability for Nash and
strong equilibria are both 1. We bound the prices of anarchy for Nash and strong equilibria. The
proof of the next Proposition is given in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 10. The price of anarchy for Nash equilibria is unbounded, even coin-ranking games
without external assets.
The total revenue depends crucially on the emergence of cycles in the strategy profile. This
requires an effort that is inherently coalitional, as such it might be unsurprising that in general Nash
equilibria fail to provide good revenue guarantees.
To analyze the quality of strong equilibria, we again consider the coin-ranking game in the form
of unit-weight multi-edges. Consider an optimal circulation f∗ of maximum total revenue in the
circulation network G′. Since we have unit-weight edges, we can assume that the optimal circulation
has binary flows on each edge. Let C(f∗) = {C1, . . . , Ck} be a decomposition of f
∗ into cycles of unit
flow. We denote by
d = min
f∗,C(f∗)
max
C∈C(f∗)
|Ci|
the min-max size of any cycle, in any decomposition C(f∗) of any optimal circulation f∗.
Theorem 11. In coin-ranking games, the strong price is anarchy is at most d.
Proof. Consider an optimal circulation f∗ and a decomposition C(f∗) such that all flow cycles Ci ∈
C(f∗) have size at most |Ci| ≤ d. The total revenue in f
∗ is given by
Rev(f∗) =
∑
Ci∈C(f∗)
|Ci| −
∑
v∈V
axv
since the circulation also accounts for the assets of the auxiliary source s.
Now consider a strong equilibrium pi in the coin-ranking game with clearing state aˆ. It yields a
binary money flow in the network. Suppose there is a cycle Ci ∈ C(f
∗) such that fe(aˆu) = 0 for all
e = (u, v) ∈ Ci. Then the firms in this cycle have an incentive to jointly deviate and place the edges
of Ci on first position in their ranking. Then the clearing state aˆ will emerge as before, adding a flow
of 1 along the cycle Ci. This is a profitable deviation for the firms of Ci.
Consequently, for every cycle Ci ∈ C(f
∗) there must be at least one edge e = (u, v) ∈ Ci such
that fe(au) = 1. Thus, the revenue in the strong equilibrium pi is
Rev(pi, aˆ) ≥
∑
Ci∈C(f∗)
1
and the ratio is at most d.
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Figure 1: A coin-ranking game with d = 5 and a strong price of anarchy of d− 1 = 4.
Proposition 12. For every d ≥ 2, there is coin-ranking game with strong price of anarchy of d− 1.
Proof. The game is given by a graph G with d+(d−1)(d−2) firms. G is constructed as follows. The
firms v1, . . . , vd are called central firms and they form a cycle of length d. For each i = 1, . . . , d− 1,
there are firms (vi,j)j=1,...,d−2 that form additional cycles of length d with the edge (vi, vi+1). Thus,
the set of edges is given by
E = {(vi, vi+1) | i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}} ∪ {(vd, v1)}
∪
⋃
i=2,...,d
(
(vi, v
1
i ) ∪ {(v
j
i , v
j+1
i ) | j = 1, . . . , d− 3} ∪ (v
d+2
i , vi−1)
)
.
All edges have unit weight. An example of the instance with d = 5 is depicted in Fig. 1. Observe
that only firms vi, i = 2, . . . , d have multiple outgoing edges. We claim that πi =
(
(vi, vi+1), (vi, v
1
i )
)
and πd =
(
(vd, v1), (vd, v
1
d)
)
is a strong equilibrium. In order to see this, let aˆ be the clearing state
corresponding to pi. The clearing state is given by
aˆv =
{
1 if v = v1, v2, . . . , vd ,
0 otherwise ,
that is, Rev(pi, aˆ) = d. Now, assume there is a non-empty coalition of player S ⊆ (v2, . . . , vd) that
all strictly increase their assets by a joint deviation. Note that vd only has a single incoming edge,
so vd /∈ S. Thus, the cycle vd, v
1
d, . . . , v
d−2
d , vd−1 cannot carry any flow. We conclude that vd−1 has
only a single edge that can carry flow. Iterating this argument yields S = ∅, a contradiction.
However, the optimal flow emerges with πi =
(
(vi, v
1
i ), (vi, vi+1)
)
and πd =
(
(vd, v
1
d), (vd, v1)
)
. It
is easy to observe that this yields a total revenue of (d − 1)d. Thus, the strong price of anarchy in
this instance is d− 1.
4 Edge-Ranking Games
4.1 Existence and Computation of Equilibria
With coin-ranking strategies we assume that firms have flexibility in allocation of single units of
assets. In this section, we focus on a more restricted class of strategies, in which firms simply rank
their outgoing edges and allocate assets in order of this ranking until they run out of assets of all
11
v1
v4v5
v2
2
v6
v7 v8
v3
2
v9
4
4
2
6
6
1
4
4
2
6
6
1
Figure 2: An edge-ranking game without a pure Nash equilibrium.
debts are paid for. In contrast to coin-ranking games, the restriction to rankings over edges (with
different weights) can destroy the existence of (optimal) stable states. In fact, there are even games
without a single pure Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 13. There is an edge-ranking game without a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the game in Fig. 2. The capacities of the edges are depicted next to the edges. Firms
v2 and v3 each have external assets of 2, the other firms have 0 external assets. Firms v1, v2 and
v3 are the only ones with multiple outgoing edges. The strategy choices of the other firms are fixed.
Due to the symmetry of the network, we can assume w.l.o.g. πv1 = ((v1, v4), (v1, v7)). There are two
possible strategy choices for each of the nodes v2 and v3. Checking all four resulting strategy profiles
yields the following utility matrix for firms v2 and v3. Inspecting the utilities, we see that there is
no pure Nash equilibrium.
πv2
πv3 ((v3, v1), (v3, v8)) ((v3, v8), (v3, v1))
4 3
((v2, v1), (v2, v5))
4 4
2 3
((v2, v5), (v2, v1))
5 3
The next theorem shows that a number of natural decision and optimization problems in edge-
ranking games are indeed computationally intractable. Note that for coin-ranking games, these
problems are either trivial (a strong equilibrium always exists) or can be solved in polynomial time
(a strong equilibrium, which also represents a profile with maximum total revenue, can be computed
in strongly polynomial time). The proof of the following theorem is deferred to Appendix A.3.
Theorem 14. Given an edge-ranking game the following problems are strongly NP-hard:
1. Deciding whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists or not.
2. Deciding whether a strong equilibrium exists or not.
3. Computing a pure Nash equilibrium, when it is guaranteed to exist.
4. Computing a strong equilibrium, when it is guaranteed to exist.
5. Computing a strategy profile with maximum total revenue.
Remark 15. It is unclear whether the problem of deciding existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in
an edge-ranking game is in NP or not, due to NP-hardness of verification that a firm plays a best
response (see Theorem 9). It is easy to see that the decision problem is in Σp2. The problem could be
Σp2-complete, similar to related decision problems in strategic max-flow games [18,23]. Proving such
a result is an interesting open problem.
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Figure 3: Edge-Ranking Game with unbounded Price of Stability.
4.2 Total Revenue of Equilibria
For edge-ranking games, the lower bound on the price of anarchy observed for coin-ranking games
does apply, i.e., the price of anarchy can be unbounded. The restriction to edge-ranking strategies
can have a drastic effect even on the quality of the best equilibrium in case it exists. In particular,
in edge-ranking games the strong price of stability can be as high as Ω(n), and the price of stability
might even be unbounded.
Proposition 16. For every ε > 0, there is an edge-ranking game with strong price of stability of at
least n/2− ε.
Proof. We consider a slight modification of the instance in Proposition 12. In contrast to the instance
described in the proof of Proposition 12, the edges (v1, vn), (vn, v1), (v1, v2) have a weight M +1 and
all other edges a weight of M . The only node with more than a single outgoing edge is still v1. If
πv1 = ((v1, vn), (v1, v2)), player v1 gets assets of M + 1, which is optimal. The total revenue for pi is
2M + 2. pi is the only Nash equilibrium and the only strong equilibrium.
In contrast, for profile pi′ with π′v1 = ((v1, v2), (v1, vn)), firm v1 only gets a revenue of M , but the
total revenue is nM . Thus, the strong price of stability is nM/(2M +2) = n/2−n/(2M +2), which
is at least n/2− ε for M ≥ n/(2ε) − 1.
Proposition 17. There is an edge-ranking game with unbounded price of stability.
Proof. Consider the game in Fig. 3, which uses the game without pure equilibrium from Fig. 2. We
add three firms. w1 has external assets equal to 2, w2 and w3 no external assets. These firms have
a cycle C of edges (w1, w2) and (w2, w3) with weight M ≫ 1, as well as edge (w3, w1) with weight
M − 2. In addition, there are edges (w1, v6) and (w2, v6) of weight 2.
In an optimal circulation, w1 and w2 prioritize the edges of C, leading to total revenue of Θ(M).
In contrast, a pure Nash equilibrium can only evolve if the w-firms ensure that the external assets
of w1 are routed to v6, in which case a Nash equilibrium can exist (as observed in the proof of
Theorem 14 above). Clearly, both w1 and w2 have an incentive to deviate towards C. Hence, if
either w1 or w2 places the edge to v6 in first rank and the other does not, a unilateral deviation
suffices to close C – thereby leaving the v-nodes with instability. However, if both w1 and w2 play
strategies πw1 = ((w1, v6), (w1, w2)) and πw2 = ((w2, v6), (w2, w3)), no unilateral deviation can lead
to flow along C. In this case, a pure Nash equilibrium evolves. Obviously the total revenue in this
equilibrium are at most a constant. Hence, the price of stability is as large as Ω(M).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied clearing mechanisms for financial networks and analyzed their prop-
erties from a computational and game-theoretic perspective. Our main results show that in these
games, solvent firms have no strategic incentives, i.e., the game is played exclusively among insolvent
firms. If firms are using coin-ranking strategies, every social optimum that maximizes the sum of
all assets in the network constitutes a strong equilibrium. Moreover, it can be computed in strongly
polynomial time. This result implies that a centralized bankruptcy settlement can achieve a clearing
state, in which the social welfare is maximized and no coalition of firms gets incentivized to deviate.
In contrast, when considering decentralized clearing and arbitrary strong equilibria, the social wel-
fare depends on the length of cycles in the money circulation of a social optimum. For pure Nash
equilibria, the deterioration in social welfare can be severe due to the lack of coordination among
firms. Alternatively, when restricting the strategy spaces to edge-ranking strategies, we show that
pure Nash and strong equilibria can be absent, hard to compute, and highly undesirable in terms of
social welfare.
There are many open problems that arise from our work. For example, real-life markets involve a
number of complex financial products (such as derivatives, credit-default swaps, etc.). Their impact
on stability and computational complexity of financial markets is only beginning to attract attention
in the literature. In this context, there are a variety of important game-theoretic aspects with respect
to pricing, information revelation, or network creation, which are crucial for understanding financial
markets and represent interesting avenues for future work.
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A Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 9
v
xi,1,0 zi,0
zi,1xi,1,1
xi,2,0
xi,2,1
xi,3,0
xi,3,1
xi,4,0
xi,4,1
zi
(a) Variable Gadget
v
c1
c2
c3
c4
x1,1,1
x2,1,1
x3,1,0
x1,2,1
x2,2,0
x4,2,1
x3,3,1
x4,3,0
x2,4,1
x3,4,0
x4,4,1
x5,4,1
(b) Example Construction of a Network
Figure 4: Structures used in the proof of Theorem 9.
For coin-ranking games with constant edge weights and external assets, the decision problem is
obviously contained in NP. We can represent the network with unit-weight multi-edges and every
strategy as a rankings over edges. This transformation takes polynomial time. Then, our algorithm
to compute aˆ runs in polynomial time.
For strong NP-hardness, we are given any instance I of Satisfiability in conjunctive normal
form with n variables and m clauses. We construct a coin-ranking game in edge-ranking representa-
tion with a player v and a strategy profile pi−v for the other players such that the following holds:
There is a strategy πv with assets av ≥ k = k
′ + n in (πv,pi−v) if and only if I has a variable
assignment that fulfills at least k′ clauses.
We construct the game as follows. We denote the variables of I by x1, . . . , xn and the clauses by
C1, . . . , Cm. For each variable xi we create firms xi,j,0 and xi,j,1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, as well as a
firm zi. For each clause Cj we add a clause firm cj . In addition, there is a global firm v, for which
we strive to find a best response.
For each clause Cj, we add a unit-weight edge from xi,j,0 to cj if xi appears as ¬xi in Cj and
from xi,j,1 to cj if it appears as xi in Cj . Flow incoming to cj will eventually indicate a literal that
fulfills the clause Cj . There is an edge (cj , v) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We will show below that this
edge ensures that satisfying clause Cj adds exactly one unit of assets to av.
For each variable xi, we add a variable gadget. It consists of nodes v, xi,j,0 and xi,j,1 for all
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, as well as auxiliary nodes zi, zi,0 and zi,1. There are unit-weight edges (v, xi,j,0) and
(v, xi,j,1) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, edges (xi,j,0, xi,j+1,0), (xi,j,1, xi,j+1,1) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, and edges
(v, zi,0), (zi,0, xi,1,0) and (v, zi,1), (zi,1, xi,1,1). Firm zi has edges (xi,m,0, zi), (xi,m,1, zi), and (zi, v).
An example for the gadget that is constructed for a variable xi and m = 4 is depicted in Fig. 4a.
Note that for every strategy of v, there is at most one cycle emerging in this gadget, since all cycles
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must include the outgoing edge of zi.
In Fig. 4b, we show an example of the network without the variable gadgets for the Satisfiability
instance I = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x4) ∧ (x3¬x4) ∧ (x2 ∨ ¬x3 ∨ x4 ∨ x5).
We construct a strategy profile pi−v as follows. Observe that firms c1, . . . , cm and x1, . . . , xn each
have a single outgoing edge, their strategies are fixed. If a firm xi,j,0 or xi,j,1 has multiple outgoing
edges, it always prioritizes the edge to nodes xi,j+1,0 and xi,j+1,1, respectively, or to zi if j = m.
In the following, we argue that there is a best response of v with asset value k′ + n if and only
if there is a variable assignment such that k′ clauses are fulfilled in I. Suppose there is a variable
assignment such that k′ clauses are fulfilled. Fix this assignment and for every satisfied clause c
choose a single literal lc that evaluates to true in the clause. Let v choose the following strategy: First,
prioritize edges (v, xi,1,0) if xa = false in the assignment and (v, xi,1,1) if xa = true in the assignment.
All theses edges will close a cycle (v, xi,1,0, xi,2,0, . . . , xi,m,0, xi, v) or (v, xi,1,1, xi,2,1, . . . , xi,m,1, xi, v).
After that, for all clause-fulfilling literals lc prioritize the edges (v, xi,j,0) if c = Cj and lc = ¬xi in
any order. Prioritize the edges (v, xi,j,1) if c = Cj and lc = xi. All these edges close a cycle via the
clause node cj , leading to a total inflow of k
′ + x.
For showing the other direction, we observe the following structural property for all variables xi.
If there is some flow on an edge (xi,m,0, zi) there cannot be any flow on edge (xi,m,1, zi), and vice
versa. We conclude that flow on some edge (xi,j,0, cj) implies flow on edge (xi,j,0, xi,j+1,0) (since it
has a higher priority), and (xi,m,0, zi), and thus no flow on (xi,j′,1, cj′) for all j
′. Analogously, we
observe that any flow on some edge (xi,j,0, cj) implies no flow on edges (xi,j′,1, cj′).
We observe that if there is a best response of player v with inflow equal to k′ + n, node v has
k′ + n incoming edges that carry flow. At most n of these edges can be (zi, v)-edges, so there are at
least k′ clause-edges (cj , v) that carry flow. Thus, all these k
′ clause vertices receive incoming flow.
If this flow for some clause cj comes from a node xi,j,0, we know by the observation above that no
edge xi,j′,1 carries flow. Thus we can set the variable xi to false, which fulfills clause Cj. Applying
this and analogous operations for flow on an edge (xi,j,1, v) yields a variable assignment which fulfills
at least k′ clauses.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Consider the game depicted on the right. All
edges have unit weight, all external assets are 0. Con-
sider pi with π1 = (e1, e3) and π2 = (e2, e4). It is a pure
Nash equilibrium with total revenue 0, since no player
can unilaterally close a cycle and increase the value of
the circulation. However, the optimal solution pi∗ with
π∗1 = (e3, e1) and π
∗
2 = (e4, e2) has total revenue 2.
1 2
3 4
e3
e4
e1 e2
A.3 Proof of Theorem 14
We start by proving hardness for computing a pure Nash or a strong equilibrium when it is guaranteed
to exist.
Hardness of Computing Nash or Strong Equilibria. Consider an instance I of the problem
3-Dimensional-Matching. I is given by a finite set T with |T | = 3k and a set U ⊆ T × T × T .
Karp [22] proved it is strongly NP-complete to decide whether there is a subset W ⊆ U such that
|W | = k and no two elements of W have a non-empty intersection. The existence of such a set |W |
would be an exact cover of T . Given an instance I of 3-Dimensional-Matching, we construct an
instance of an edge-ranking game as follows. Create a central vertex v. For each set u ∈ U , create
a vertex u and connect v to u by an edge (v, u) with capacity c((v, u)) = 3. For each pair t, u with
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t ∈ T , u ∈ U and t ∈ u we create a vertex t and add an edge (u, t) with capacity c((u, t)) = 1.
Finally, we connect each element t ∈ T by an edge (t, v) with c((t, v)) = 1 to v.
The idea is that computing any pure Nash or strong equilibrium reduces to finding a best response
for player v. This best response, however, gives total assets of av = 3k if and only if I has a solution.
Hence, by computing a pure Nash or strong equilbrium, we obtain a best response for v and thereby
a certificate as to whether I is solvable or not (and vice versa).
Let us first argue that there is always a strong equilibrium in this edge-ranking game. First, we
note that all vertices t ∈ T have a single outgoing edge. We fix an arbitrary feasible strategy vector
pi
′. We will argue that best-response dynamics yield a strong equilibrium. For every strategy of v,
there is at most one vertex ui with aui ∈ {1, 2}. For all other vertices u ∈ U \ {ui}, every strategy
piu is a best response for u due to Proposition 4. We conclude that if pi
′ is not a strong equilibrium,
there is a coalition S of players with an improvement move such that all players in S strictly increase
their assets. If v /∈ S, there is a player ui ∈ S ∪ U . The improving move of ui also increases assets
of v. Thus, the assets of v increase in every step of the dynamics. This shows that the dynamics
terminate with a strong equilibrium.
Let pi be any Nash equilibrium in the edge-ranking game. We show the following claim. There is
a subset W such that |W | = k and no two elements of W have a non-empty intersection in I if and
only if av = |T | in pi.
First, let us assume that pi is a Nash equilibrium with av = |T |. Since each outgoing edge from
v has capacity 3 and |T | = 3k, we know by the definition of edge-ranking games that |{u ∈ U | au =
3}| = k. We denote these vertices by u1, . . . , uk. Thus, aui = 3 for i ≤ k and aui = 0 for all i > k.
We will show that the sets corresponding to vertices u1, . . . , uk form a solution to I. Suppose there
are two sets u1, u2 that have a non-empty intersection. If this is the case, there is an element t ∈ T
with t ∈ u1 ∩ u2. There are edges (u1, t), (u2, t) in the edge-ranking game that carry flow. This is a
contradiction to the fact that av = |T |.
Now, let us assume there is a solution u1, . . . , uk to I. We will show that every pure Nash
equilibrium pi in the edge-ranking game yields assets of av = 3k for vertex v. The total capacity
of all incoming edges of v is exactly 3k, so av ≤ 3k clearly holds for all strategy profiles. We will
now argue that independent of the strategy choices of all other players, player v can always obtain
av = 3k. Let πv = ((v, u1), . . . , (v, uk), . . . ). Since u1, . . . , uk exactly cover all elements t ∈ T , this
induces 3k cycles in the TopCycleIncrease algorithm described above. This is independent of
the strategy choices of all other vertices since they always have the property that either all outgoing
edges are fully saturated, or there is no flow at all.
This shows that even in a class of games with guaranteed existence, computing a pure Nash
equilibrium or a strong equilibrium is strongly NP-hard.
Hardness of Computing Social Optima. Consider the previous construction. Every simple
cycle in the network involves v and exactly two other firms. Since there are no external assets. As
such, the total revenue in the system is exactly 3av . Hence, by computing a best-response for v, we
also obtain a strategy profile with maximum total revenue. This proves strong NP-hardness for the
computation of optimal strategy profiles. Note that this result is in contrast to coin-ranking games,
where an optimal strategy profile can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
Hardness of Deciding Existence of Nash and Strong Equilibria. For hardness of the decision
version, we adjust the construction from the first part of this proof and combine it with the game
without pure Nash equilibrium in Fig. 2. Observe that external assets of 1 for firm v9 in Fig. 2 would
lead to the dominant strategy πv3 = ((v3, v1), (v3, v9)) for v3. Given this strategy, it is straightforward
to derive the assets for all strategy choices of v1 and v2.
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πv1
πv2 ((v2, v1), (v2, v6)) ((v2, v6), (v2, v1))
4 5
((v1, v4), (v1, v7))
9 3
4 4
((v1, v7), (v1, v4))
9 3
Thus, given that v9 has external assets of 1 and v3 plays the dominant strategy πv3 = ((v3, v1), (v3, v9)),
the strategies πv1 = ((v1, v7), (v1, v4)) and πv2 = ((v2, v1), (v2, v6)) represent a strong equilibrium.
We use this insight to design a class of edge-ranking games based on instances of 3-Dimensional-
Matching with the following property. If instance I has a solution, the game has a strong equilibrium
(and hence a pure Nash equilibrium); if I has no solution, the game has no pure Nash equilibrium
(and hence no strong equilibrium). We adjust the construction from the first part of this proof and
combine it with |T | copies of the example of Fig. 2: In the construction from the first part of the proof
above, delete all edges (t, v) for all t ∈ T and add an external asset of av = 3k. We know that each
t ∈ T receives an inflow of 1 if and only if there is a solution to the instance I of 3-Dimensional-
Matching. The instance depicted in Fig. 2 is copied |T | times. We denote the |T | copies of vertex
v9 by v
1
9 , v
2
9 , . . . , v
|T |
9 . Add an edge with capacity 1 from each ti ∈ T to the corresponding copy of v9,
i.e., edges (ti, v
i
9) for i = 1, . . . , |T |. If there is a solution to I, all vertices ti ∈ T receive a flow of 1.
This flow is forwarded to vertices vi9 and can be seen as their external asset. Hence, there is a strong
equilibrium in all copies and also in the game as a whole. On the other hand, if there is no solution
to I, there is always some ti ∈ |T | with ati = 0, say, w.l.o.g. at1 = 0. The corresponding vertex v
1
9
does not receive any inflow. Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium in the respective copy and no Nash
equilibrium in the game.
B Computation of Clearing States for Edge-Ranking Games
For edge- and coin-ranking games, we provide a more detailed analysis of the structure of clearing
states in a strategy profile pi. In these games, every clearing state a ∈ A corresponds one-to-one to
a circulation in the graph, where cycle flows follow a partial order. We use this structural insight to
show that the unique revenue-maximizing clearing state aˆ can be computed in polynomial time.
Necessary Cycles. For a given strategy profile pi, consider the circulation network G′ = (V ′, E′)
with auxiliary source s and the corresponding auxiliary edges. For completeness, we treat s as a
firm with a fixed strategy πs over its outgoing auxiliary edges. Due to Proposition 2, s exactly fill
all outgoing edges in every clearing state. As such, the strategy of πs has no impact on the set of
clearing states. We also extend πv and define the auxiliary edge (v, s) to be the last edge chosen by
vertex v.
Consider a firm v ∈ V and some certain amount of k coins that have already been paid by v.
Then there is a uniquely defined outgoing edge for the next coin reaching v. We call this edge the
active edge of v. Every firm v always starts paying debt on the highest ranked edge πv(1). If some
edge (v,w) = πv(k) is saturated, the firm switches its active edge from πv(k) to πv(k + 1).
Now, consider the set of all active edges for a ≡ 0. Every firm v 6= s has exactly one outgoing
active edge πv(1). The set of active edges must be partitioned into disjoint cycles with attached trees.
Each tree attached to a cycle is rooted in a node from the cycle, and directed towards the cycle C.
We define the orbit of C by
o(C) = {v ∈ V | ∃ v-u-path of active edges, for some u ∈ C},
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i.e., the set of nodes v from which we can reach C over top-ranked edges. Now, consider the auxiliary
source s. Note that a ≡ 0 is a feasible clearing state in G′, but as = ℓ(s) is a necessary constraint
to ensure that a represents a clearing state in the original graph G. However, as long as as < ℓ(s)
there is an active outgoing edge of s and all nodes (including s) belong to some orbit. Hence, there
is a cycle C with s ∈ o(C). Flow conservation in clearing states and the monotonicity of strategies
implies that some amount of assets of s must eventually reach C. Due to flow conservation in C, a
flow of at least δC = min{c(e) | e ∈ C} must thus be present on every edge of C. This is a necessary
condition in every clearing state a ∈ A.
It is straightforward to inductively apply this argument, thereby obtaining a sequence of necessary
cycles C that must be filled with flow δC = min{c(e) − fe | e ∈ C}. In particular, when a flow of
fe = δC has been assigned to every edge e ∈ C, the top-ranked edge of at least one of the vertices
in C changes. This implies that the orbits change, i.e., the orbit o(C) partitions into new suborbits,
or parts that get attached to other orbits. Note that once a vertex v has filled all regular outgoing
edges, the top-ranked edge becomes (v, s).
Note that orbits present at the same time are always mututally disjoint. Thus, for two existing
orbits o(C1) and o(C2), pushing flow along C1 can never change the top-ranked edges of o(C2). Hence,
it is necessary that all the cycles C, where s eventually appears in the orbit, must get assigned a flow
increase δC in order to reach as = ℓ(s). Once we reach a state a where as = ℓ(s), an “orbit” o(s)
emerges composed of a tree rooted in s. At this point, we have indeed constructed a feasible clearing
state, which by induction is the unique minimal clearing state in G′ that applies in G.
Optional Cycles. In the following, we characterize the structure of all other feasible clearing
states a ∈ A by applying similar observations. Fix some feasible clearing state a (with as = ℓ(s))
and consider the set of all active edges.
Suppose there is a cycle C with some orbit o(C), i.e., a set of nodes v that are not attached to
the tree rooted in s. In this case, one can push a non-zero amount of flow along C, i.e. increase av
by a strictly positive amoung for every v ∈ C. This obviously yields a new feasible clearing state.
When an edge becomes saturated, the set of active edges changes and the orbit o(C) disappears, i.e.,
gets spilt up as explained above (new suborbits, parts attached to other orbits, parts attached to the
tree rooted in s).
Note that there might exist multiple orbits at the same time and, thus, multiple possibilities to
extend a by increasing flow along a cycle. However, as observed above, orbits present at the same
time are always mututally disjoint, and pushing flow along cycle C1 can never change the top-ranked
edges in an orbit o(C2) present at that time. Now consider some vertex v ∈ o(C). In order to
create some clearing state a′ with a′v > av it is necessary to push flow along C until av is reached
(if v ∈ o(C) ∩ C) or o(C) disappears and spilts up (if v ∈ o(C) \ C). Since the flow adjustments
monotonically increase all assets, there is a one-to-one correspondence between sets of cycles with
flow increase and the clearing states.
Note that the cycles chosen for flow increase form a partial order: A cycle C ′ might not be present
in the beginning – there might be predecessor-cycles C that have to be filled up to δC to break an
existing orbit o(C), change some of the top-ranked edges, and make C ′ appear. In the argumentation
above, it can be seen that the set of predecessor cycles pred(C ′) for some cycle C ′ is uniquely defined
resulting from the ranking of edges in pi.
The arguments above imply a natural algorithm to compute aˆ, which is similar in spirit to the
classic TopTradingCycles algorithm for house allocation [28]. The TopCycleIncrease algorithm
iteratively raises money flow along cycles among the top-ranked edges in the circulation network G′.
Thereby it computes the unique maximal clearing state aˆ from the lattice. The algorithm runs in
polynomial time – in every round it increases the flow along a cycle C by δC . At this point at least
one edge (from G or auxiliary) becomes saturated. In terms of the original network G = (V,E), the
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algorithm needs at most O(|V | + |E|) rounds. Each round can easily be implemented in strongly
polynomial time.
Proposition 18. In every edge- or coin-ranking game, Algorithm TopCycleIncrease computes
the unique maximal clearing state aˆ in strongly polynomial time.
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